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In 1922, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes writing for the United States
Supreme Court held that organized baseball was "purely a state affair"'
and while money was involved, baseball "would not be called trade or
commerce in the commonly accepted use of those words."2 Since Justice
Holmes' decision in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National
League of Professional Baseball Clubs,3 organized baseball has cherished
its antitrust exemption and rigorously protected and fought over it in the
courts. One of the individuals who challenged baseball's unique legal
position was Curt Flood, in Flood v. Kuhn.4 In 1969, Curt Flood was
traded from the St. Louis Cardinals to the Philadelphia Phillies, without
his knowledge or consent. When informed of the trade, Flood petitioned
Bowie Kuhn, the Commissioner of Baseball at the time, requesting that
he be declared a free agent. When his request was denied and with help
from the Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA), Flood
filed a federal antitrust lawsuit against Major League Baseball (MLB)
claiming that baseball's reserve rule violated federal antitrust law. In
1972, the Supreme Court, for the third time in 50 years, upheld base-
ball's antitrust exemption even though it acknowledged that "profes-
sional baseball is a business and it is engaged in interstate commerce."5
In holding organized baseball exempt from federal antitrust law, the
Supreme Court blindly followed Justice Holmes' decision and held that
* Associate Professor in the Ithaca College Sport Management Program and Adjunct
Professor in the School of Business, Ithaca College, Ithaca, New York; B.A. 1985, University
of Massachusetts-Amherst; J.D. 1992, Western New England College School of Law. The au-
thor teaches courses in Sports Law and Labor Relations in Sport.
1. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,
259 U.S. 200 (1922), see also infra notes 25-38 and accompanying text.
2. Id.
3. Id
4. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 2d. 728 (1972), see also infra notes 62-78 and accompany-
ing text.
5. Id. at 282.
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if there were "any inconsistency or illogic" in the decision it was up to
Congress to remedy it, not the Court.6
It took twenty-six years, but Congress has finally acted to remedy the
inconsistency or illogic in baseball's antitrust exemption. Although too
late to help his playing career,7 Flood may have finally won his victory
against MLB when on October 27, 1998, President Bill Clinton signed
into law the Curt Flood Act of 1998.8 The Curt Flood Act, which over-
turns part of baseball's 76-year-old antitrust exemption, grants to major
league baseball players, for the first time, the same rights under antitrust
law as other professional athletes. Congress also hopes that by passing
the Curt Flood Act and making the playing field between the owners
and players more equal, it will bring some stability to baseball's labor
relations. 9
Although baseball has traditionally fought hard to keep its antitrust
exemption, the Curt Flood Act would never have unanimously passed in
Congress if it were not for the support and urging it received from both
MLB and the Players' Association. In the last Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA), both MLB and the Players' Association agreed to
"jointly request and cooperate in lobbying the Congress to pass a law
that will clarify that Major League Baseball Players are covered under
the antitrust laws."' 1
6. Id. at 285.
7. After sitting out for one year, Curt Flood played part of the season with the Washing-
ton Senators before retiring from baseball in 1971. The Curt Flood Act is late in another way
as well. Curt Flood died of cancer in 1997. Flood Act Lessens Baseball's Antitrust Protection,
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct.28, 1998, at C3.
8. The Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-297, 112 Stat. 2824 (1998).
9. Baseball has had eight work stoppages since the formation of the current Major League
Baseball Players' Association. These stoppages include: players' strikes in 1972, 1980, 1981,
1985, and 1994-95, and management lockouts in 1975, 1976, and 1990.
10. Article XXVIII-Antitrust.
The clubs and the Association will jointly request and cooperate in lobbying the Con-
gress to pass a law that will clarify that Major League Baseball Players are covered
under the antitrust laws (i.e., that Major League Players will have the same rights under
the antitrust laws as do other professional athletes, e.g., football and basketball play-
ers), along with a provision that makes it clear that the passage of that bill does not
change the application of the antitrust laws in any other context or with respect to any
other person or entity. If such a law is not enacted by December 31, 1998 (the end of
the next Congress), then this Agreement shall terminate on December 31, 2000 (unless
the Association exercises its option to extend this agreement as set forth in Article
XXVII).
BASIc AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE AMERICAN LEAGUE OF PROFESsIONAL BASEBALL CLUBS
AND THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF PROFEsSIONAL BASEBALL CLUBS AND MAJOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL PLAYERS AssOcIAnoN, effective January 1, 1997, at 107.
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To answer why MLB was willing to give up part of its cherished anti-
trust exemption, this paper examines both the Curt Flood Act of 1998
and the impact it will have on baseball. The paper begins with a historic
review of baseball's antitrust exemption. The review is broken into three
sections: pre-Federal Baseball, Baseball's Supreme Court trilogy and
post Flood v. Kuhn. Next, the paper examines the Curt Flood Act of
1998; its origins, purpose and the potential impact it may have on future
labor negations and disputes. Finally, the article concludes by looking at
what is left of Major League Baseball's antitrust exemption after passage
of Curt Flood Act of 1998 and the impact the Act will have on future
antitrust lawsuits against Major League Baseball.
HISTORY OF BASEBALL AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW
Although the National League began playing professional baseball
before Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890,11 baseball
more than any other sport has had to continuously defend itself against
antitrust allegations. This section of the paper examines how the courts
have historically treated organized baseball under Federal antitrust laws.
The review is divided into three sections: pre-Federal Baseball, Base-
ball's Supreme Court trilogy, and post Flood v. Kuhn to show how the
courts have relied on stare decisis to let stand baseball's antitrust exemp-
tion even though the legal theory upon which the original decision was
based is no longer valid.
A. Pre-Federal Baseball
The first court to examine whether the rules and regulations gov-
erning professional baseball players were covered under federal antitrust
laws was American League Baseball Club of Chicago v. Chase.12 In
March of 1914, Harold H. (Hal) Chase signed a contract to play first
base for the Chicago White Sox. On June 15, in the middle of the sea-
son, Chase informed Chicago that he intended to back out of his con-
tract. On June 20, Chase entered into a second contract to play with the
Buffalo Club of the new Federal Baseball League.'3 In an attempt to
11. The National League of Professional Baseball Clubs (The National League), base-
ball's first professional league, began playing an organized schedule in 1876. HAROLD SEY-
MOUR, BASEBALL: Tim EARLY YEARs (1989).
12. American League Baseball Club of Chicago v. Chase, 86 Misc. 441, 149 N.Y.S. 6 (Sup.
Ct. 1914).
13. See id. at 8. The Federal League was not the first minor league to challenge for major
league status. The first league to challenge the national league was the American Association;
the others include the Union Association, the Players League and the American League. The
1999]
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keep Chase in Chicago and away from the Federal League, the White
Sox sought a court injunction.14
Refusing to grant Chicago an injunction, the court held that although
Chase had "special, unique and extraordinary characteristics as a base-
ball player,"' 5 there was an "absolute lack of mutuality, both of obliga-
tion and remedy" in Chase's contract, that made the contract
unenforceable for want of mutuality.16 As evidence, the court noted that
the standard player contract was terminable by the employing club on
only 10 days' notice, but that due to the scheme of the National Agree-
ment, the club and organized baseball had an absolute option on the
player's services for the succeeding year.
After rejecting Chicago's argument on contract grounds, the court
went on to examine whether the "National Agreement 7 and the rules
Union Association, 1884, and the Players League, 1890, survived for only one year in direct
competition with the National League. The American Association reached a non-competition
agreement with the National League and is still in existence, while the American League
joined the National League to form Major League Baseball in 1903. SEYMoUR, supra note 11.
14. See id. at 6.
15. Id. at 8; citing Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De Gex. M. & G. 604. The court noted that it was
a well settled rule that an employer could prevent an employee under contract from working
for another if that employee's services are of a unique and unusual character. This doctrine
was first applied to professional baseball players in Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ward, 24
Abb. N. C. 393, 9 N.Y. Supp. 779 (1890), when the New York National League team sought an
injunction against John Montgomery Ward from playing in the Players League in direct com-
petition with the National League. Ward was the head of the Brotherhood of Professional
Baseball Players, the players' first attempt at unionizing. The court denied the team's injunc-
tion request due to the lack of mutuality in the baseball contracts signed by the players. See
SEymou1, supra note 11, at 221-239, for more information on John Montgomery Ward and
the Brotherhood of Professional Baseball Players.
16. American League Baseball Club of Chicago, 149 N.Y.S. at 14. The court found that
"the player [by way of his contract] is made a chattel; the title of the club to the player, if he be
a player of a major league, is made absolute. . ." Id. at 12.
17. The court stated "that a combination of 40 leagues, major and minor, has been formed
under the terms of the National Agreement, controlling for profit the services of 10,000 play-
ers of professional baseball, practically all of the good or skillful players in the country" Id. at
17.
The National Agreement controlled "the services of these skilled laborers, and providing
for their purchase, sale, exchange, draft, reduction, discharge, and blacklisting, would seem to
establish a species of quasi peonage unlawfully controlling and interfering with the personal
freedom of the men employed." Id. See also, Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ewing, 42 Fed.
198 (S.D. NY 1890) which found that "the parties to the National Agreement comprise all, or
substantially all, of the clubs in the country which employ professional players, this National
Agreement, by indirection, but practically, affects every professional player, and subordinates
his privilege of engaging as he chooses to the option of the club by which he is under reserva-
tion.") The National Agreement was first enacted to end a bidding war that was driving up
player salaries between the National League and the American Association. The first National
Agreement was signed by the National League, the American Association and the Northwest-
[Vol. 9:347
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and regulations adopted pursuant thereto, violated the Sherman Act.' 8
The court, while finding organized baseball had "ingeniously devised and
created" a monopoly to control the business of baseball played in the
United States, also found that baseball was not interstate trade or com-
merce within the meaning of Sherman Antitrust Act.'9 In finding organ-
ized baseball outside the coverage of the Sherman Act, the court held
that baseball "is an amusement, a sport, a game ... it is not a commodity
or an article of merchandise subject to the regulation of Congress" and
the Sherman Act.2"
The court also examined whether "organized baseball, operating
under the provisions of the National Agreement and the Rules and Con-
tracts subsidiary thereto, is an illegal combination or monopoly in con-
travention of the common law."'" After reviewing the National
Agreement, which controlled the services of every professional baseball
player and provided "for their purchase, sale, exchange, draft, reduction,
discharge, and blacklisting."'22 The court found that organized baseball,
excluding the newly organized Federal League "is now as complete a
monopoly of the baseball business for profit as any monopoly can be
made and is in contravention of the common law." 23
The court found that:
while the services of these baseball players are ostensibly secured
by voluntary contracts a study of the system . . .as practiced
under the plan of the National Agreement, reveals the involun-
tary character of the servitude which is imposed upon players by
the strength of the combination controlling the labor of practi-
cally all of the players in the country. This is so great as to make
it necessary for the player either to take the contract prescribed
by the commission or abandon baseball as a profession and seek
some other mode of earning a livelihood. There is no difference
ern League. In the agreement each League was allowed to reserve a set number of players and
the other leagues agreed that they would respect those contracts. The National Agreement
eventually involved other leagues as well. See also, SEYMOUR, supra note 11, at 317-322.
18. American League Baseball Club of Chicago, 149 N.Y.S. at 16.
19. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides, that "[e]very contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States ... is declared to be illegal .. " 15 U.S.C.A. § 1. Section 2 of the Sherman Act
provides that "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several states... shall be deemed guilty of a felony ...." 15 U.S.C.A. § 2.
20. American League Baseball Club of Chicago, 149 N.Y.S. at 17.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 7.
23. Id. at 17.
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in principle between the system of servitude built up by the oper-
ation of this National Agreement, which as has been shown, pro-
vides for the purchase, sale, barter, and exchange of the services
of baseball players-skilled laborers-without their consent, and
the system of peonage brought into the United States from Mex-
ico and thereafter existing for a time within the territory of New
Mexico. The quasi peonage of baseball players under the opera-
tions of this plan and agreement is contrary to the spirit of Ameri-
can institutions, and is contrary to the spirit of the Constitution of
the United States.24
B. Baseball Supreme Court Trilogy
The most famous antitrust challenge concerning baseball, and the
case that provides it wvith an antitrust exemption, is the first case in base-
ball's Supreme Court trilogy, Federal Baseball.' The Federal League26
declared its intention to establish itself as a third major league in 1913
and began play in 1914.27 After two years of direct competition for play-
ers and fans, both the Federal League and Major League Baseball" were
ready to reach some form of settlement. In December of 1915, the
leagues entered into a "Peace Agreement" which resulted in the dissolu-
tion of the Federal League and all of its constituent clubs.2 9 As part of
24. Id. at 19.
25. Federal Baseball, 259 U.S. 200.
26. Under the leadership of James Gilmore, the Federal League proclaimed itself a third
major league in 1914. As part of its strategy to compete with the National and American
Leagues, the Federal League offered major league players hefty pay raises to jump to the
Federal League. The league started in 1914 with teams in Baltimore, Buffalo, Brooklyn, Chi-
cago, St. Louis, Kansas City, Indianapolis and Pittsburgh. Indianapolis, even though the team
won the league championship in 1914, folded after the season and was replaced in 1915 by
Newark.
The Federal League started in 1915 by attacking Major League Baseball in the courts. The
league filed an antitrust lawsuit against the National and American Leagues. Unfortunately
for the Federal League, it filed the suit in the Federal District Court of Kenesaw M. Landis,
who was later to become Major League Baseball's first Commissioner. Landis, a big baseball
fan, delayed making a decision in the case. Instead, he urged both sides to negotiate a settle-
ment, which eventually lead to the merger of the two leagues. In December of 1915, after only
two years, the Federal League folded. DAVID S. NEFr & RICHARD M. COHEN, THE SPORTS
ENCYCLOPEDIA: BASEBALL (15th ed. 1995). See also LEE LowEN-SH, THE IMPERFECT DIA-
MOND: A HISTORY OF BASEBALL'S LABOR WARS (rev. ed. 1991).
27. See LoWENFISH, supra note 26.
28. Although the article uses Major League Baseball, the actual named defendants in the
case are the National League of Professional Base Ball Clubs and the American League of
Professional Base Ball Clubs; the presidents of the two Leagues and a third person, constitut-
ing what is known as the National; and three Federal League owners.
29. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Federal Baseball Club of Balti-
more, 269 Fed. 681, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1920).
[Vol. 9:347
MLB ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
the settlement, the Federal League received $600,000.00, two of its own-
ers were allowed to buy existing major league teams, and the contracts
of some Federal League players were sold to the highest bidders among
the major league teams."
However, the settlement made no provisions for the Federal League
team in Baltimore. With no league to play in and no where to go after
the Federal League dissolved, the Baltimore team folded and its owners
filed an antitrust suit alleging that organized baseball conspired to mo-
nopolize the baseball business in violation of the Sherman Act. The Bal-
timore franchise claimed that MLB "destroyed the Federal League by
buying up some of the constituent clubs and in one way or another in-
ducing all those clubs except the plaintiff to leave their League."' 31 A
federal district court agreed with Baltimore's argument and awarded
them $240,000.00 in treble damages, costs, and attorney fees.32
Baltimore's victory was short lived. The District Court's decision was
overturned by the Court of Appeals.33 In reaching its decision, the Court
of Appeals, citing Chase, held that baseball was a game and "did not
constitute trade or commerce. '34 The Court of Appeals also noted that
the giving of exhibitions of baseball "is local in its beginning and in its
end" and therefore not interstate.35
Disappointed with the Court of Appeals' decision, Baltimore ap-
pealed to the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, in up-
holding the Court of Appeals' decision, also held that the business of
baseball was purely a state affair and did not involve interstate com-
30. The owner of the Chicago team, Charles Weeghman, became a major shareholder of
the Chicago Cubs and moved the team into the stadium, Wrigley Field, which he built for his
Federal League Team. The owner of the St. Louis team, Phil Ball, received the American
League St. Louis franchise. The owner of the Brooklyn team, Harry Sinclair, was allowed to
sell back all his players at a large profit. See LOwEVNFISH, supra note 26, at 91.
31. Federal Baseball, 259 U.S. at 207.
32. The court reached the conclusion that MLB was engaged in interstate commerce and
that it had attempted to monopolize and did monopolize a part of that commerce. The only
question presented to the jury was whether MLB had conspired to destroy the Federal
League. See National League of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Federal Baseball Club of Bal-
timore, 269 Fed. 681 (D.C. Cir. 1920).
33. Id.
34. Id at 686. It is interesting to note that the Court of Appeals, in finding that baseball
was not a business, but a game, relied on the Chase court's view of baseball in 1914. In reach-
ing their decisions, future courts would rely on Federal Baseball's view of the business of
baseball. It is hard to believe that the game played in 1914 resembles anything like the busi-
ness baseball has grown into.
35. Id. at 685.
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merce within the meaning of the Sherman Antitrust Act.36 In delivering
the Supreme Court's decision, Justice Holmes stated that although
"competitions must be arranged between clubs from different cities and
States ... the transport is a mere incident, not the essential thing. '37
Justice Holmes also found that "a baseball exhibition, although made for
money, is not trade or commerce in the commonly accepted use of those
words, since personal effort not related to production is not a subject of
commerce."
38
This decision to exempt baseball from federal antitrust law, would
survive repeated challenges for the next seventy-six years until Congress
passed the Curt Flood Act. 39 Although not part of baseball's Supreme
Court trilogy, the first case after Federal Baseball to challenge baseball's
antitrust immunity and the one that came closest to overturning it was
Gardella v. Chandler.4"
Daniel Gardella was a journeyman baseball player who played base-
ball for the New York Giants during the 1944 and 45 seasons and was
under contract with them for the 1946 season. During the 1946 spring
training, with the World War II veteran having returned to the States,
Gardella signed a contract to play professional baseball in Mexico. Gar-
della, a minor league player before the war, did not believe that he had a
chance to make the Giants.41 Upon returning to the United States, Gar-
della, who only played one year in Mexico, was blacklisted from organ-
ized baseball.
36. The business is giving exhibitions of base ball, which are purely state affairs. It is
true that in order to attain for these exhibitions the great popularity that they have
achieved, competitions must be arranged between clubs from different cities and States.
But the fact that in order to give the exhibitions the Leagues must induce free persons
to cross state lines and must arrange and pay for their doing so is not enough to change
the character of the business.., the transport is a mere incident, not the essential thing.
That to which it is incident, the exhibition, although made for money would not be
called trade of commerce in the commonly accepted use of those words. As it is put by
defendant, personal effort, not related to production, is not a subject of commerce.
Federal Baseball, 259 U.S. at 208.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. The decision survived even after other professional sports fell under the coverage of
antitrust law. See Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); Washington Professional Basketball
Corp. v. NBA, 147 F.Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y.1956); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Phil-
adelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F.Supp. 462 (1972); United States v. International Boxing
Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
40. Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949), rev'g 79 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y.
1948).
41. For a complete history and insight of the case, see Lowm'ansH, supra note 26.
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The Commissioner of Baseball, Albert B. "Happy" Chandler, in an
attempt to avert another war over players' salaries, declared that any
player who jumped to the Mexican League would be barred42 from or-
ganized baseball.43 No longer able to make a living by playing organized
baseball professionally, Gardella filed a lawsuit challenging baseball's re-
serve clause and the Supreme Court's decision in Federal Baseball.
The Federal District Court in New York, citing Federal Baseball, dis-
missed the case 4 for failure to state a cause of action and Gardella ap-
pealed to the Second Circuit Court. In a 2-1 decision, the Second Circuit
ruled that due to the use of radio and television the game of baseball is
now interstate commerce.45 The Second Circuit, noted that the game of
baseball and the Supreme Court's expending definition of interstate
commerce had changed so much since Federal Baseball, decided that
there was enough merit in the case to warrant a trial.
In rejecting organized baseball's argument that it was exempt from
federal antitrust law under Federal Baseball, Judge Frank stated that
"the Supreme Court's recent decisions have completely destroyed the
vitality of Federal Baseball... and have left that case but an impotent
zombi.""6 In distinguishing Gardella from Federal Baseball, the Second
Circuit found baseball's reserve clause "shockingly repugnant to moral
principles"'47 which "results in something resembling peonage of the
baseball player."4 The Second Circuit also noted that unlike the situa-
tion in the Federal Baseball case, organized baseball now had "lucra-
tively contracted for the interstate communication, by radio and
television, of the playing of the games."4 9 Finally, while acknowledging
42. The Commissioner of Baseball, Albert B. "Happy" Chandler, imposed a ban of up to
five years for any player who jumped from his contract to play in the Mexican League. While
blacklisted, the player could not play for any club in organized baseball, either in the major or
minor leagues. In effect, this clause prevented a player from playing for any team other than
his original employer, unless that employer consents. See LowENRsH, supra note 26.
43. Organized baseball was comprised of the two major leagues, the National and the
American, and the minor leagues made up of clubs composing leagues of eight grades based
upon the respective abilities of the players in the several clubs in each of such leagues. See
Gardella, 172 F.2d at 403.
44. Gardella v. Chandler, 79 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
45. Gardella, 172 F.2d at 408.
46. Id. at 408-9.
47. Id. at 409.
48. Id.
49. In Federal Baseball, the Supreme Court held that the traveling across state lines was
but an incidental means of enabling games to be played locally and therefore insufficient to
constitute interstate commerce. The Second Circuit, however, found that the interstate com-
munication by radio and television is in no way a means, incidental or otherwise, of perform-
ing the intra-state activities and thus constituted inter state commerce. See id. at 410.
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that it could not overturn a Supreme Court decision, the court stated
that it was not required to "wait for a formal retraction in the face of
changes plainly foreshadowed."5
Although remanded back to the district court for trial, the case never
made it back to court. A week before the case was scheduled to be
heard, organized baseball settled with Gardella for $60,000.00.51
Although organized baseball received a scare in Gardella, the next case,
the second in baseball's Supreme Court trilogy, is more indicative of how
the courts have treated organized baseball's antitrust immunity. The
case, Toolson v. New York Yankees,5 2 which is actually three cases 5 3 re-
affirmed that Congress had no intention of including baseball within the
scope of federal antitrust law.
In Toolson, George Toolson, a minor league player within the Yan-
kee farm system refused to report to the team's Eastern League affiliate
after he had been demoted from the Yankees' International League
team. In an attempt to free himself from his contract, Toolson filed an
antitrust lawsuit against organized baseball arguing that its reserve
clause and farm system denied him the opportunity to improve his
livelihood.
50. "This Court's duty is to divine as best it can, what would be the event of the appeal in
the case before it." Id. at 409, n. 1.
51. See LOWENFISH, supra note 26, at 167.
52. Toolson, 346 U.S. 356.
53. The United States Supreme Court attached two other baseball cases to Toolson: Ko-
walski v. Chandler, 202 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1953) & Corbertt v. Chandler, 202 F.2d 428 (6th Cir.
1952).
In Kowalski, Walter Kowalski, a minor league player within the Dodger organization, ar-
gued that organized baseball, through the use of the reserve clause, deprived him of the rea-
sonable value of his services and the opportunity for professional promotion. The United
States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction and for failure to state a cause of action. In affirming the decision, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the "structure known as 'organized baseball' was not en-
gaged in trade or commerce within [the] Sherman and Clayton Acts." Kowalski, 202 F.2d 413.
In rejecting the argument that the sale of broadcasting rights for radio and television distin-
guished the case from Federal Baseball, the Sixth Circuit found the broadcasting rights to be
essential, in the same manner as the telegraph rights that were examined in Federal Baseball.
Id. The Sixth Circuit also refused to disregard Federal Baseball on the speculation that the
Court might overturn its decision. Id.
In Corbertt, Corbertt was the owner of minor league team in El Paso, Texas who wanted to
sign some of the players coming back from the Mexican League. Corbertt filed suit against
baseball after he was barred from signing the players due to the fact that they were blacklisted
by organized baseball. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the order of the District Court dismissing
Corbertt's complaint. Corberit, 202 F.2d 428.
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Having lost in both the District Court54 and the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeal,55 Toolson appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
Toolson, therefore, was the Supreme Court's first opportunity to correct
Federal Baseball by including baseball within the scope of federal anti-
trust law. The Supreme Court, however, in a one page decision, upheld
its decision in Federal Baseball ruling that Congress had no intention of
including the business of baseball within the scope of the federal anti-
trust laws.5 6 In support of this decision, the Supreme Court noted that
Congress had thirty years since Federal Baseball to bring the business of
baseball under the scope of federal antitrust law and that during that
time baseball had been allowed to develop with the belief that it was not
subject to antitrust law.5 The Supreme Court concluded that it was the
obligation of Congress to bring baseball within the scope of federal anti-
trust law, not the courts.58
Unlike Federal Baseball, the Supreme Court's decision in Toolson
was not unanimous. In his dissent, Justice Burton stated that it was im-
possible to believe that "organized baseball, in 1953, still is not engaged
in interstate trade or commerce."5 9 In support of his conclusion, Justice
Burton observed that the Supreme Court in Federal Baseball only held
that the activities of organized baseball did not amount to interstate
commerce, not that those activities were exempt from the Sherman
Act.6 ° Only Congress has the power to exempt organized baseball from
the antitrust laws noted Justice Burton. Justice Burton also noted that
while there might be "possible justification of special treatment for or-
ganized sports" Congress had failed to pass four bills which would have
54. See Toolson v. New York Yankees, 101 F.Supp. 93 (1951).
55. See Toolson v. New York Yankees, 200 F.2d 198 (9th Cir, 1952).
56. See Toolson, 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
57. See id. at 357.
58. See id.
59. Id. In finding that baseball was engaged in interstate commerce, Justice Burton ex-
amined a number of areas, including: capital investments used in conducting competitions, the
team travel between states, its numerous purchases of materials in interstate commerce, game
attendance by out of state audiences, radio and television contracts, advertising, and its highly
organized 'farm system' of minor league baseball clubs. See id. at 358.
Justice Burton also noted a report in 1952 of the Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly
Power, of the House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, dealing with organized
baseball in relation to the Sherman Act. The report stated: "Organized baseball' is a combina-
tion of approximately 380 separate baseball clubs, operating in 42 different States, the District
of Columbia, Canada, Cuba, and Mexico ... which made professional baseball inherently
intercity, intersectional, and interstate. H. R. Rep. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 7, cited in
Toolson, 346 U.S. at 358.
60. See id. at 360.
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granted baseball and all other professional sports a complete and unlim-
ited immunity from the antitrust laws.61
The last case in baseball's Supreme Court trilogy was Flood v.
Kuhn.62 Curt Flood, an all-star outfielder with the St. Louis Cardinals,
was traded to the Philadelphia Phillies in 1969, without Flood's knowl-
edge or consent.63 When informed of the trade,6 4 Flood complained to
Commissioner Bowie Kuhn and requested that Kuhn declare him a free
agent, thereby allowing him to negotiate with any major league team he
wished. When Kuhn denied his request, Flood filed a lawsuit65 claiming
that organized baseball's reserve rule violated federal antitrust law.
In rejecting Flood's lawsuit, the District Court66 and the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals67 found that Federal Baseball and Toolson were
controlling and felt compelled to uphold them.68 Flood appealed, and
"for the third time in 50 years, ' 69 the Supreme Court agreed to examine
whether organized baseball was within the reach of federal antitrust law.
After an extensive history of the game and some of its players,70 the
Supreme Court held that the "longstanding exemption of professional
baseball's reserve system from federal antitrust laws is an established
aberration in which Congress has acquiesced, is entitled to [the] benefit
of stare decisis, and any inconsistency or illogic is to be remedied by the
Congress and not by the Supreme Court."71 Therefore, the Court held
61. Id. at 363.
62. Flood, 407 U.S. 258.
63. Curt Flood never reported to Philadelphia in 1970, and he sat out the year. After the
1970 season, Flood's rights were sold to the Washington Senators. Flood agreed to play for
Washington in 1971, but retired from baseball on April 27. See id. at 266.
64. One of Flood's contentions was that he was not consulted about the trade beforehand.
It was only after the trade was finalized that he was informed of the deal by telephone. See id.
at 265.
65. For the first time, the Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA), the play-
ers' collective-bargaining representative, was involved in a player's antitrust challenge. The
MLBPA was formed in 1966, with Marvin Miller as its Executive Director.
66. See Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F.Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The District Court went so far as
to state that "[b]aseball has been the national pastime for over one hundred years and enjoys
a unique place in our American heritage... The game is on higher ground; it behooves every
one to keep it there." See id. at 297.
67. See Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d. 264 (2nd Cir. 1971).
68. Id. One Judge went so far as to state in his concurring opinion that there was "no
likelihood" that the courts would overturn Federal Baseball. See id. at 268.
69. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 260.
70. Starting in 1846, when the New York Nine defeated the Knickerbockers 23 to 1, Jus-
tice Blackmun reviewed the history of baseball from the Cincinnati Red Stockings in 1869 and
the formation of the National League in 1876, all the way to the formation of the Major
League Baseball Players Association in 1966. See id. at 262.
71. Id. at 258.
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that although baseball enjoyed an exemption from the federal antitrust
laws, it was an "aberration" confined to baseball.72
The Supreme Court did acknowledge in Flood that baseball was a
trade or commerce engaged in interstate commerce, but it still refused to
overturn baseball's antitrust exemption.73 In support of its decision, the
Supreme Court noted that "baseball with full and continuing congres-
sional awareness, has been allowed to develop and to expand un-
hindered by federal legislative action."74 The Court reasoned that since
Congress had failed to revoke baseball's antitrust exemption, Congress
must have intended for baseball to be outside the reach of the antitrust
laws.75
Just as in Toolson, the Supreme Court's decision was not unanimous.
In his dissent, Justice Douglas held that if the Supreme Court were to
consider the question of baseball for the first time upon a clean slate,
there would be no doubt that the Court would hold baseball subject to
federal antitrust regulation.76 As for the failure of Congress to pass leg-
islation overruling Federal Baseball and subjecting baseball to federal
antitrust laws, Justice Douglas argued that "the unbroken silence of
Congress should not prevent us from correcting our own mistakes. '77 If
in making its decision the Court was to rely upon congressional inaction,
Justice Douglas noted that Congress also failed to pass any legislation
exempting professional sports from antitrust regulation.78
C. Baseball's Antitrust Exemption after Flood
Based upon baseball's Supreme Court trilogy, it is clear that baseball
enjoys some form of exemption from antitrust laws. Therefore, the only
question is the scope of that exemption. For example, is the entire busi-
ness of baseball exempt or is it just baseball's reserve rule and other
72. "Other professional sports operating interstate-football, boxing, . . . basketball,
hockey and golf-are not so exempt." Id. at 283.
73. See Flood, 407 U.S. at. 283.
74. Id. at 284.
75. Citing Toolson, the court stated that "[w]ithout re-examination of the underlying is-
sues, the [judgment] below [is] affirmed on the authority of Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore
v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, supra, so far as that decision determines
that Congress had no intention of including the business of baseball within the scope of the
federal antitrust laws." Id at 284.
76. See id. at 289.
77. Id.
78. See id. Congress did pass legislation exempting professional sports from federal anti-
trust laws with regard to broadcasting rights. See Sports Broadcast Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1291.
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player controls. As the following cases demonstrate, the courts are
mixed on the scope of the exemption.
1. A Broad View of Baseball Antitrust Exemption
The first case after Flood to challenge the scope of baseball's anti-
trust exemption was Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn.79 Charles Finley,
the owner of the Oakland Athletics, sued the Commissioner of Baseball
Bowie Kuhn over Kuhn's decision to void the sale of three Oakland
players.80 When Kuhn rejected the sales, Finely filed a lawsuit princi-
pally challenging the scope of the Commissioner's authority to void the
sales. The complaint also argued "that the Commissioner, acting in con-
cert with others, conspired to eliminate Oakland from baseball in viola-
tion of federal antitrust laws."'"
In rejecting Finley's antitrust argument, the district court held that
"baseball... is not subject to the provisions of the [Sherman Antitrust]
Act."82 On appeal, Finley argued that any antitrust exemption profes-
sional baseball might enjoy applies only to the reserve system, and not to
the entire business of baseball.8 3 In affirming the district court's deci-
sion, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that regardless of any
mention of the reserve system in the Flood case, the Supreme Court
intended to exempt the whole business of baseball, and not just the re-
serve system or any other particular facet of that business from the fed-
eral antitrust laws. 4
79. Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 541 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 876 (1978).
80. Just before the trading deadline of June 15, 1976, Fimley attempted to sell Joe Rudi
and Rollie Fingers to the Boston Red Sox for $2 million and Vida Blue to the New York
Yankees for $1.5 million. Finley argued that he was going to lose Rudi and Fingers to free
agency and that he could use the money to develop new talent. The first free agents were
declared on December 23, 1975, when Peter Seitz's arbitration panel held that players Andy
Messersmith and Dave McNally were free agents able to negotiate with any clubs they
wanted. In rejecting the sales, Kuhn claimed that he was acted in the best interest of baseball.
See id. at 541. (The author wonders what Kuhn would have done when the Florida Marlins
traded away their team after winning the World Series).
81. Id. at 531.
82. Id.
83. Finley relied upon two quotations from Justice Blackmun's opinion in Flood, "[flor
the third time in 50 years the Court is asked specifically to rule that professional baseball's
reserve system is within the reach of the federal antitrust laws." Flood, 407 U.S. at 259, and
"[w]ith its reserve system enjoying exemption from the federal antitrust laws, baseball is, in a
very distinct sense, an exception and an anomaly. Id. at 282.
84. See id. at 541. The court also referred to the Flood court which stated that
"[p]rofessional baseball is a business and it is engaged in interstate commerce.. ." and "we
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Another case that interpreted baseball's Supreme Court trilogy as
granting MLB blanket immunity is Professional Baseball Schools &
Clubs, Inc. v. Kuhn." The plaintiff, the owner of a baseball franchise in
the Carolina League, filed a lawsuit challenging baseball's "player as-
signment system and the franchise location system; the monopolization
of the business of professional baseball, and the Carolina League's rule
requiring member teams to only play games with other teams." 6 The
district court dismissed the antitrust claim for want of subject matter ju-
risdiction, and the plaintiff appealed. The Eleventh Circuit Court, just as
the Seventh Circuit had done in Finley, rejected the antitrust argument.
The Eleventh Circuit, citing baseball's Supreme Court trilogy, found that
"[a]lthough it may be anomalous, the exclusion of the business of base-
ball from the antitrust laws is well established."' Therefore, since each
of the activities in the complaint concerned matters that are an integral
part of the business of baseball, they fell within baseball's antitrust
exemption.
2. A Narrow View of Baseball Antitrust Exemption
Within the last few years, there has been a willingness by some courts
to chip away at baseball's federal antitrust exemption. The first case to
take a more narrow view of organized baseball's antitrust exemption was
Piazza v. Major League Baseball."8 In Piazza, Vincent Piazza 9 and
Vincent Tirendi reached an agreement with Robert Lurie, the owner of
the San Francisco Giants, to purchase the Giants and move the team to
Tampa Bay, Florida. The National League President, Bill White, and the
Ownership Committee of MLB, however wanted to keep the franchise
in San Francisco and rejected the proposal to relocate the Giants and
began to look for local buyers. After a frantic search, local investors
were finally found and Lurie sold the Giants to the local group for $100
million,90 $15 million less than the Piazza and Tirendi partnership had
offered.
adhere once again to Federal Baseball and Toolson and to their application to professional
baseball." Finley, 569 F.2d at 541, citing, Flood, 407 U.S. at 282.
85. 693 F.2d 1085 (11th Cir.1982).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1086.
88. Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F.Supp. 420 (1993).
89. Vincent Piazza is the father of New York Mets catcher Mike Piazza.
90. Peter Gammons, Magowan in San Francisco's corner, BosToN GLOBE, Nov. 1, 1992,
at 66. The San Francisco group was headed by Peter Magowan, chairman of Safeway Corp.
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After MLB rejected their offer to purchase the team and move it to
Florida, Piazza and Tirendi ified an antitrust lawsuit.9 ' In their lawsuit,
the plaintiffs "claim[ed] that Baseball ha[d] monopolized the market for
Major League Baseball teams and that Baseball ha[d] placed direct and
indirect restraints on the purchase, sale, transfer, relocation of, and com-
petition for such teams."9 Faced with another antitrust lawsuit, but rely-
ing on the baseball Supreme Court trilogy, MLB moved to dismiss the
case for failure to state a cause of action as a result of baseball's antitrust
exemption.
The district court refused to extend baseball's antitrust exemption to
the entire "business of baseball." 93 In refusing, the court ruled that "the
exemption created by Federal Baseball is inapplicable ... because it is
limited to baseball's reserve system." 94 In support of this conclusion, the
district court interpreted the Supreme Court decision in Flood as "strip-
ping from Federal Baseball and Toolson any precedential value those
91. In August 1992, Piazza & Tirendi executed an agreement with Lurie to purchase the
Giants for $115 million. Lurie also agreed not to negotiate with anyone else and to use his best
efforts to secure from defendant Major League Baseball approval of the sale. See Piazza, 831
F. Supp. at 424.
92. The plaintiffs alleged that:
(1) Baseball's actions 'have placed direct and indirect restraints on the purchase, sale,
transfer and relocation of Major League Baseball teams and on competition in the
purchase, sale, transfer and relocation of such teams, all of which directly and indirectly
affect interstate commerce,' (2) 'Major League Baseball is an unreasonable and unlaw-
ful monopoly created, intended and maintained by defendants for the purpose of per-
mitting defendant team owners, an intentionally select and limited group, to reap
enormous profits,' and (3) Baseball has achieved these restraints on trade and its mo-
nopoly status by engaging in 'an unlawful combination and conspiracy... the substan-
tial terms of which have been to eliminate all competition in the relevant market
[defined as the market for American League and National League baseball teams], to
exclude plaintiffs from participating in the relevant market, to establish monopoly con-
trol of the relevant market and to unreasonably restrain trade by denying the sale,
transfer and relocation of the Giants to the Tampa Bay area,' The effect of Baseball's
actions, plaintiffs allege, has been, among other things, to restrain their right to engage
in the business of Major League Baseball, restrain their right to competitively bid on
Major League Baseball teams, and cause plaintiffs to lose contract rights and profits.
Id. at 429, n. 13 (citations omitted).
93. The court referred to the language used by the Supreme Court in Radovich where the
Court specifically limited "the rule ... established [in Federal Baseball and Toolson] to the
facts there involved, i.e., the business of organized professional baseball." Piazza, 831 F.Supp.
at 420, citing Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 451 (1957).
94. The court also examined the markets in which the anticompetitive activity took place.
In Federal Baseball the anticompetitive activity was in the market for the exhibition of base-
ball games. In Piazza, the anticompetitive activity is in the market for the "sale of ownership
interests in baseball teams-a market seemingly as distinguishable from the game exhibition
market as the player transportation market." 831 F. Supp. at 440.
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cases may have had beyond the particular facts there involved, i.e., the
reserve clause." 95 There can be no doubt, the court held, that after
Flood, "[p]rofessional baseball is a business ... engaged in interstate
commerce" 96 and that baseball's exemption from the federal antitrust
laws created by Federal Baseball was limited to the reserve clause.97
Therefore, the court concluded, since the case did not involve the re-
serve system, baseball's conduct could be subject to federal antitrust
laws.
After the district court rejected MLB's motion to dismiss the anti-
trust claims based on baseball's antitrust exemption, MLB moved for an
immediate appeal on the issue to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.98
Judge Padova of the district court refused baseball's motion, ruling that
such an action would unnecessarily delay the proceedings in the district
court.9 9
As in Gardella, this case also never made it to trial. A day before
jury selection MLB settled the case with Piazza and Tirendi for a re-
ported $6 million.1"' Unfortunately for baseball, the settlement did not
end the legal troubles resulting from MLB's refusal to move a team into
Florida. In Florida state court, baseball was facing two state antitrust
lawsuits.
The first case was filed by Florida Attorney General, Robert But-
terworth. After baseball voted to reject the sale and transfer of the Gi-
ants, he issued an antitrust civil investigative demand (CD) to the
National League of Professional Baseball Clubs and its president Wil-
liam D. White pursuant to section 542.28, Florida Statutes (Supp.
95. Id. at 436.
96. Id. citing Flood, 407 U.S. at 282.
97. See id.
98. Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 836 F.Supp. 269 (E.D. Pa 1993).
99. See id. at 270. The decisions by both the trial judge and the appellate court in certifica-
tion hearings are discretionary; certification however is only appropriate in "exceptional"
cases. Id. citing Rottmund v. Continental Assurance Co., 813 F.Supp. 1104, 1112
(E.D.Pa.1992). In considering whether to allow an interlocutory appeal, the court must deter-
mine whether such an appeal would result in a single trial or multiple trials, undue delays, and
whether costs will be reduced. The Piazza court found that "instead of promoting efficiency
and certainty, which are the goals of § 1292(b), interlocutory appeal in this case would create
the potential for chaotic litigation,... that would complicate rather than simplify, and com-
pound costs and time." Piazza, 836 F. Supp. at 272.
100. See Todd Schulz, Sports, USA TODAY, Nov. 3, 1994, at 7C. Acting Commissioner Bud
Selig also issued an apology on behalf of Baseball, "[w]e apologize to each of you for any
inconvenience, embarrassment or loss which you may have suffered as a result of any com-
ments or inferences drawn by anyone from such comments."
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1992). 101 The specific focus of the CID was "[a] combination or conspir-
acy in restraint of trade in connection with the sale and purchase of the
San Francisco Giants baseball franchise."'10 2
The league, faced with the Attorney General's CID, petitioned the
Florida courts to have the CID set aside. After losing at both the trial
level and the District Court of Appeals, °3 the Attorney General ap-
pealed to the Florida Supreme Court. In Butterworth v. National League
of Professional Baseball Clubs °4 the Florida Supreme Court was asked
to determine the parameters of baseball's antitrust exemption. In partic-
ular, whether "the antitrust exemption for baseball recognized by the
United States Supreme Court in [Federal Baseball] and its progeny ex-
empt all decision involving the sale and location of baseball franchises
from federal and Florida antitrust law?"' 05 The Attorney General ar-
gued that the exemption only applied to the reserve system. The Na-
tional League on the other hand argued that baseball's antitrust
exemption should be applied broadly to "the business of baseball."'0 6
In reversing the decisions of the lower courts, the Florida Supreme
Court held that although there was "no question that Piazza is against
the great weight of federal cases regarding the scope of the exemption
... none of the other cases have engaged in such a comprehensive analy-
sis of Flood and its implications. "107 The Florida Supreme Court held
that even though the Piazza court was the only federal court to have
interpreted baseball's antitrust exemption so narrowly, the United States
Supreme Court's language in Flood supported such an interpretation. 0 8
It "defied legal logic and common sense," the Florida Supreme Court
101. Section 542.28(1), of the Florida Statutes authorizes the Attorney General to issue a
civil investigative demand (CID) to any person that the Attorney General has reason to be-
lieve may be in possession, custody, or control of documentary material or information rele-
vant to a civil antitrust investigation. The CIDs may require that person to produce
documents for inspection, to answer written interrogatories, or to give sworn testimony. But-
terworth v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 644 So. 2d. 1021 (Fla. 1994).
102. Buttenvorth, 644 So. 2d. 1021.
103. Butterworth v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 622 So.2d 177 (Fla.
5th DCA 1993)
104. 644 So.2d. at 1022. The Circuit Court for Osceola County, granted Major League
Baseball's petition. That decision was affirmed by the District Court of Appeal in, But-
terworth, 622 So. 2d at 177.
105. Butterworth, 644 So. 2d at 1022.
106. Id. at 1024.
107. Id. at 1025.
108. See id. at 1024.
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held, that baseball would have such a broad judicially created antitrust
exemption, while all the others professional sports did not.1° 9
The second state antitrust claim, Morsani v. Major League Base-
ball,"' involved the Tampa Bay Baseball Group (TBBG) and their at-
tempts to purchase a Major League Baseball team and relocate it to the
Tampa Bay area. At the 1982 Major League Baseball winter meetings,
the plaintiff, Frank Morsani, sought advice from various team owners
concerning the purchase and relocation of a Major League team to the
Tampa Bay area; and was told by various owners that if the TBBG could
secure a site for a stadium in Tampa,"' the owners would support and
approve the sale and relocation of the Minnesota Twins. 112 Relying
upon the owners promised support, Morsani entered into negotiations to
purchase the Minnesota Twins." 3 However, after securing an agreement
to purchase a minority interest in the Twins, but before Morsani and his
group could complete a deal for the Twins, Griffith and Griffith-Haynes,
with baseball's approval, sold their majority interest in the Twins to Carl
Pohlad." 4 After initially refusing, Morsani and his group, in exchange
for the promise of another team, assigned their interest in the Twins to
Pohlad. Besides interfering in their attempt to buy the Twins, Morsani
and his group also alleged that baseball interfered with their efforts to
109. 644 So. 2d. at 1026. The court also recommended that the United States Supreme
Court take another look at Major League Baseball and "determine whether (1) a judicially-
created exemption for baseball is still viable and, (2) if the exemption exists, whether that
exemption should be applied narrowly, as interpreted in Piazza, or broadly," as in Finley, 569
F.2d at 541.
110. 663 So. 2d. 653.
111. Relying upon these statements the Tampa Bay Baseball Group at a cost of over $2
million, Morsani secured a long-term lease with the Tampa Sports Authority for the construc-
tion of a baseball stadium. Id. at 655.
112. Id
113. In 1984, Calvin Griffith and Thelma Griffith-Haynes, owners of 51% of the stock of
Minnesota Twins, agreed to sell their controlling interest to the plaintiffs for approximately
$24 million on the condition that they first buy H. Gabriel Murphy's 42.14% minority interest
in the corporation. "The plaintiffs then negotiated and entered into a fully-executed written
contract with Murphy for the purchase of his interest, at a purchase price of $11.5 million. The
contract provided that its closing was conditioned upon prior approval by the owners of other
American League teams, as the Constitution of the American League required, and any other
approvals which might validly be required." Id.
114. Id. Baseball also demanded that the Tampa group assign its contract with Murphy to
Pohlad. At the time this assignment was demanded, the value of the minority interest
purchased by the plaintiffs had increased from $11.5 million to $25 million. The Tampa group
refused to assign the contract to Pohlad until Baseball paid them the $13.5 million increase in
value of the contract, plus the $2 million previously expended on the stadium lease. Id. at 655-
656.
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purchase the Texas Rangers, 115 and failed to grant them a promised ex-
pansion team. 16
Although the decision concentrated on other issues, 117 the court re-
lied on the Florida State Supreme Court's decision in Butterworth, and
ruled that baseball's antitrust exemption was limited and only covered
the reserve system." 8
Another case that rejected baseball's claim of blanket antitrust im-
munity was Postema v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs.119 The plaintiff, a female umpire alleged that baseball discrimi-
nated against her in her job. Postema claimed that Baseball's conduct
violated antitrust laws. Although not decided on antitrust grounds, the
District Court rejected baseball's claim of blanket antitrust immunity.
The court found that while "the baseball exemption to the antitrust law
immunizes baseball from antitrust challenges to its league structure and
its reserve system, the exemption does not provide baseball with blanket
immunity . . . in every context in which it operates.' 120 The court
reached this decision after holding that the Supreme Court decision in
Flood was an "endorsement of a limited view of the exemption.''2
The willingness of the courts in Piazza, Butterworth, Morsani and
Postema to limit baseball's antitrust exemption has not become the rule.
In McCoy v. Major League Baseball,22 a federal District Court in the
state of Washington interpreted baseball's Supreme Court trilogy as ex-
tending the antitrust exemption to the entire business of baseball. In Mc-
115. Morsani and his group had reached an agreement with Eddie Gaylord for his 33%
interest, and had entered into a written contract with Eddie Chiles for his 58% controlling
interest in the team. 663 So. 2d. at 656.
116. The two new expansion teams went to Miami and Colorado. Id. The plaintiffs alleged
antitrust violations and tortious interference corresponding to the plaintiffs' attempts to
purchase both the Minnesota Twins, Inc. and Texas Rangers, Ltd. and to acquire an expansion
team, respectively. Id. at 655.
117. On the tortious interference argument, the Florida District Court of Appeal found
that Major League Baseball's alleged "use of threats and intimidation and conspiratorial con-
duct" was outside of their rights and could show tortious interference with advantageous con-
tractual and business relationships. Serafino v. Palm Terrace Apartments, Inc., 343 So. 2d 851
(Fla. 2d DCA 1976). The court identified the following necessary elements in establishing the
tort of interference with a contractual or business relationship: "(1) the existence of a busi-
ness relationship under which the plaintiff has legal rights, (2) an intentional and unjustified
interference with that relationship by the defendant and (3) damage to the plaintiff as a result
of the breach of the business relationship." Morsani, 663 So. 2d at 656.
118. See id. at 653.
119. 799 F. Supp. 1475 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 998 F.2d 60 (2d Cir.1993).
120. Id. at 1488.
121. Id.
122. 911 F. Supp. 454 (W.D.Wash. 1995).
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Coy, a group of fans and business owners brought an antitrust action
against MLB steaming from the owners' alleged unfair labor practice
during the 1994 strike. 23
In granting baseball's motion to dismiss, the District Court rejected
the reasoning behind the Piazza courts' interpretation of baseball's anti-
trust exemption as only applying to baseball reserve system. After exam-
ining baseball's Supreme Court trilogy, the McCoy court found that
baseball's antitrust exemption encompassed the entire business of base-
ball.124 The "great weight of authority," the court noted, recognizes that
baseball's antitrust exemption covers the business of baseball, and until
Congress or the Supreme Court sees fit to alter the rule, the exemption
covers the business of baseball.'"
TH CURT FLOOD Acr OF 1998
As mentioned in the introduction, as part of the 1997 Basic Agree-
ment between MLB and the MLBPA both sides agreed that they would
jointly request and lobby for the passage of a law clarifying that profes-
sional baseball players are covered under antitrust law. The result of this
joint effort is the Curt Flood Act.
An important aspect of the Curt Flood Act, which amends the Clay-
ton Act by adding a new section at the end,'2 6 is that it only applies to
Major League Baseball players. 27 Therefore any antitrust issues cover-
123. On December 31, 1993, the collective bargaining agreement between the twenty-
eight Major League Clubs (the "Owners") and the Major League Baseball Players Associa-
tion (the "Players Association") expired. When the owners and the Players Association were
unable to agree on a new contract, the players went on strike, resulting in the cancellation of
the remainder of the 1994 Major League Baseball season, the 1994 World Series, and a por-
tion of the 1995 season. The owners and the Players Association each filed unfair labor prac-
tice charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The NLRB also filed a
complaint against the Owners alleging an unfair labor practice and seeking a temporary in-
junction pursuant to Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1600).
Finding reasonable cause for the NLRB to conclude that the owners had engaged in an unfair
labor practice, a district court granted a temporary injunction to preserve the status quo. See
Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Comm., Inc., 880 F.Supp. 246
(S.D.N.Y.1995), affd, 67 F.3d 1054 (2d. Cir.1995). The injunction reinstated the terms of the
expired collective bargaining agreement until (1) a new agreement was reached, (2) the
NLRB rendered a final disposition of the related administrative matter currently pending, or
(3) the district court found that the parties are at an impasse. Id. at 261.
124. McCoy, 911 F. Supp. at 456.
125. Id. at 458.
126. See The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 27.
127. The stated purpose of the Curt Flood Act is to grant Major League Baseball players
the same coverage under the antitrust laws as other professional athletes, e.g., football and
basketball players. See The Curt Flood Act of 1998.
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ing minor league baseball, the amateur draft, the relationship between
the major leagues and the minors, franchise relocation, intellectual prop-
erty, the Sports Broadcasting Act, and umpires are specifically excluded
from coverage under the Curt Flood Act.
This section of the paper analyzes some of the key sections and provi-
sions of the Curt Flood Act and their possible impact on future antitrust
litigation involving MLB.
The first section to review is Section 3.
Sec. 3. Application of the Antitrust Laws to Professional Major
League Baseball.
The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. Sec.12 et seq.) is amended by adding
at the end the following new section:
Sec. 27 (a) Subject to subsection (b) through (d), the conduct,
acts, practices, or agreements of persons in the business of organ-
ized professional major league baseball directly relating to or af-
fecting employment of major league baseball players to play
baseball at the major league level are subject to the antitrust laws
to the same extent such conduct, acts, practices, or agreements
would be subject to the antitrust laws if engaged in by persons in
any other professional sports business affecting interstate
commerce.
128
In an attempt to accommodate the concerns of the minor leagues,
The Senate Judiciary Committee amended the original proposal of the
Curt Flood Act to include the word "directly" immediately before the
phrase "relating to or affecting employment" and the phrase "major
league players" before the phrase "to play baseball."'12 9 The Senate Ju-
diciary Committee included these two phrases "at the behest of the mi-
nor leagues.., to ensure that minor league players, particularly those
who had spent some time in the major leagues, did not use new subsec-
tion (a) as a bootstrap by which to attack conduct, acts, practices or
agreements designed to apply to minor league employment."' 30 The Act,
therefore, only applies to the conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of
Major League Baseball that affect the employment of Major League
Baseball players. In making the changes, Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah,
Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee and the principle sponsor 3' of
the Curt Flood Act stated that the changes were "in keeping with the
128. 15 U.S.C. § 27(a).
129. CONG. REc. S 9494-9498 (July 30, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
130. Id.
131. Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont, Strom Thurmond of South Carolina and Daniel
Moynihan of New York also introduced and were lead sponsors of the bill.
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neutrality sought by the Committee with respect to parties and circum-
stances not between major league owners and major league players."' 32
The next paragraph of the Act, §27 (b), begins to outline the Act's
restrictions.
§27 (b) No court shall rely on the enactment of this section as a
basis for changing the application of the antitrust laws to any con-
duct, acts, practices, or agreements other than those set forth in
subsection (a). This section does not create, permit or imply a
cause of action by which to challenge under the antitrust laws, or
otherwise apply the antitrust laws to, any conduct, acts, practices,
or agreements that do not directly relate to or affect employment
of major league baseball players to play baseball at the major
league level, including but not limited to...
"While providing major league players with the antitrust protections
of their colleagues in the other professional sports," the legislative his-
tory of the Act makes it clear that the Act "is absolutely neutral with
respect to the state of the antitrust laws between all entities and in all
circumstances other than in the area of employment as between major
league owners and players."' 34 Senator Hatch also emphasized that the
Act "affects no pending or decided cases except to the extent a court
would consider exempting major league clubs from antitrust laws in their
dealing with major league players.' 13 The Senate Judiciary Committee
inserted the language limiting the court's ability to rely on the Flood Act
in changing or supporting how the antitrust laws are applied to baseball
because it felt that the language was crucial in getting the Flood Act
passed. 36
Congress, therefore, presented with the perfect opportunity to clarify
the judicial debate over the application of federal antitrust law to base-
ball, failed to take advantage of this opportunity. In fact, the language of
the Act does not even attempt to overturn or clarify Major League Base-
132. CONG. REc. S 9494-9498.
133. Only those acts, practices, or agreements that directly relate to or affect employment
of the major league players to play baseball at the major league level may be challenged under
the Flood Act. § 27 (d)(2) prohibits plaintiffs from using the Flood Act to piggyback in claims
that would otherwise be excluded.
134. CONG. REc. S 9494-9498.
135. "Whatever the law was the day before this bill passes in those other areas it will
continue to be after the bill passes." Id. The Judiciary Committee also noted that "both the
parties [Major League Baseball and the MLBPA] and the Committee agree that Congress is
taking no position on the current state of the law one way or the other." Id.
136. Ted Curtis, Partial Repeal of Major League Baseball's Antitrust Exemption is En-
acted, 16 TmE SPORTS LAWYER 1, 6-8 (Nov./Dec. 1998).
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ball's antitrust exemption in any other area except in the area of employ-
ment between major league owners and players.
The next six sections of the Act specifically identify areas excluded
from coverage under the Act. The first two sections, §§27 (b)(1) and (2),
are designed to protect the relationship between Major League Baseball
and the minor leagues.
§27(b)(1) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons
engaging in, conducting or participating in the business of organ-
ized professional baseball relating to or affecting employment to
play at the minor league level, any organized professional base-
ball amateur or first-year player draft, or any reserve clause as
applied to minor league players;
§27(b)(2) the agreement between organized professional major
league baseball teams and the teams of the National Association
of Professional Baseball Leagues, commonly known at the "Pro-
fessional Baseball Agreement," the relationship between organ-
ized professional major league baseball and organized
professional minor league baseball, or any other matter relating
to organized professional baseball's minor leagues.
As mentioned above it was important for the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee to accommodate the concerns of the minor leagues, and these
sections accomplish this goal by "direct[ing] a court's attention to only
those practices, or aspects of practices, that affect major league play-
ers."'137 Senator Hatch included these sections at the urging of several
members of the Senate Judiciary Committee because of the complex re-
lationship between the major leagues and their affiliated minor
leagues. 138 Due to this relationship, the Senate Judiciary Committee was
concerned "that the bill might inadvertently have a negative impact on
the minor leagues."'1 39 Therefore, as long as a player is in the minor
leagues, the Curt Flood Act will not apply to them or their relationship
with their minor league team and league.
137. CONG. REc. S 9494-9498.
138, One of the reasons Senators would want to protect minor league teams by excluding
them from coverage under the Curt Flood Act is because of the large amount of tax payer
money local communities have invested in such stadiums. See ARTHuR T. JOHNSON, MINOR
LEAGUE BASEBALL AND LOcAL ECONoMIc DEVELOPMENT (1995) (for more information on
city investments in minor league facilities).
139. CONG. REc. S 9495. Stanley Brand, vice president of the National Association of
Professional Baseball Leagues expressed his concern to the Judiciary Committee that the Act
did not adequately protect the minor leagues. Due to the reservations by Brand, Bud Selig,
then chairman of the Major League Executive Council, wrote the Committee a letter stating
that although he supported the Curt Flood Act, his support was tempered because of the
concerns of the minor leagues. See S. REP. No. 118, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1997).
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After addressing the minor league issue, the next area excluded from
coverage is franchise expansion, relocation, or ownership issues. Section
27 (b)(3) states that:
§27(b)(3) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons
engaging in, conducting or participating in the business of organ-
ized professional baseball relating to or affecting franchise expan-
sion, location or relocation, franchise ownership issues, including
ownership transfers, the relationship between the Office of the
Commissioner and franchise owners, the marketing or sales of the
entertainment product or organized professional baseball and the
licensing of intellectual property rights owned or held by organ-
ized professional baseball teams individually or collectively;
The only real area MLB's antitrust exemption has not worked is in
the area franchise relocation and ownership. Section 27 (b)(3), makes it
clear that the conduct, acts, practices, or agreements relating to or affect-
ing franchise expansion, location or relocation, franchise ownership is-
sues, including ownership transfers are specifically excluded from
coverage under the Act. In light of the recent litigation concerning this
issue, there are two ways Congress' inaction can be interpreted.
First, it could be argued that Congress, at the urging of baseball, in-
serted this clause for the specific purpose of challenging the decisions in
Piazza4 ' and Butterworth,"'4 thereby protecting MLB from future anti-
trust lawsuits over "affecting franchise expansion, location or relocation,
franchise ownership issues."142 Support for this argument can also be
found in a letter by the Congressional Budget Office concerning the cost
of the Curt Flood Act. In the cost estimate of the Act, June O'Neill,
Director of the Congressional Budget Office states that the Act "would
remove baseball's current exemption from antitrust laws, except that it
would retain the antitrust exemption for minor league baseball and for
decisions regarding league expansion, franchise location, the amateur
draft and broadcast rights, and employment relations with nonplayers,
such as umpires."' 43
The second argument is that Congress, by failing to clarify or specifi-
cally overturn Piazza, wanted to include this type of conduct under fed-
eral antitrust law. This argument is supported by the language at the
140. 831 F. Supp. 420.
141. 644 So. 2d. at 1022.
142. 15 U.S.C. §27 (b)(3).
143. S. REP. No. 118, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1997). The cost estimate also acknowl-
edged that it was removing baseball's antitrust exemption only to allow players to challenge
baseball owners in federal court.
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beginning of §27 (b) stating that "[n]o court shall rely on the enactment
of this section as a basis for changing the application of the antitrust laws
to any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements other than those set forth
in subsection (a).'.1 4 4
The fourth area excluded from coverage under the Curt Flood Act is
the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961.145 The Sports Broadcasting Act of
1961 exempts professional football, baseball, basketball, and hockey
leagues from antitrust laws in the area of network TV contracts. 46 The
Act was enacted after the American Football League (AFL) pooled the
entire league's television rights and negotiated a four-year television
contract with ABC for $1.7 million per year. ABC's contract with the
AFL was the first instance wherein a league sold the television fights of
the entire league, up to this point teams sold their rights individually.
The National Football League (NFL), worried about the competitive
balance between its large and small market teams, and the impact the
AFL's contract would have on the competitive balance between the
leagues, entered into a league wide contract with CBS. The NFL's new
contract would also pool league members' television rights and equally
divide all television revenue. 47 However, the NFL was barred from
144. 15 U.S.C. §27 (b).
145. Id. at §27 (b)(4).
146. Before the passage of the Sports Broadcast Act of 1961, professional sports teams
sold the television rights of their games individually. In 1960, the American Football League
(AFL) negotiated a four-year television contract for the rights to the entire league with ABC
for $1.7 million per year. The AFL's deal was unique in that for the first time an entire profes-
sional sports league pooled its television rights and sold them to a single network. The NFL
fearing that the deal would provide the AFL with a competitive advantage also sought to pool
its television rights. The NFL however was barred from pooling its television rights by the
court in United States v. National Football League, 196 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Pa. 1961). Believing
that the NFL was at a competitive disadvantage, Pete Rozelle, the NFL Commissioner, ap-
proached Congress seeking special legislation, which would allow the league to pool its mem-
bers' television rights. After hearing from Rozelle and the heads of the other professional
sports leagues, Congress passed the Sports Broadcast Act of 1961. The Act exempts profes-
sional sports leagues from antitrust litigation in the limited area of pooling and selling the
league's television rights as a package. The Act also restricts the ability of the leagues to
define the geographical area into which the pooled telecasts may be broadcast. For more
information on the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 See DAVID S. NEFr & RicHARD M. CO-
HEN, THE FOOTBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA: THE CoMPLETE HIsTORY OF PRoFEssIoNAL NFL
FOOTBALL FROM 1892 TO THE PREsENr (1991); Gary R. Roberts, Pirating Satellite Signals of
Blacked-Out Sports Events: A Historical and Policy Perspective, 11 COLUMBA-VLA JoUR-
NAL OF LAW & THE ARTs, 363-386 (1987); Robert A. Garrett & Philip R. Hochberg, Sports
Broadcasting and the Law, 59 INDIANA LAW JouRNAL, 155-192 (1984); and John T. Wolohan,
NFL Broadcasts and the Home System Defense of the Federal Copyright Act, 5, JOuRNAL OF
LEGAL AsPEcrs OF SPORT 35 (1995).
147. Wolohan, supra note 146.
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pooling its television rights by the court. 4 ' With no other alternative,
the NFL petitioned Congress for a limited antitrust exemption. After
hearing from each of the professional sports leagues, Congress passed
the Sports Broadcast Act, thereby allowing professional sports leagues
to pool and sell television rights as a package.14 9
The fifth area excluded from coverage under the Act is the relation-
ship between organized baseball and umpires.'50 Although Major
League Umpires have their own union and their relationship with base-
ball has been almost as combative' 5' as that of the players, umpires are
excluded from coverage under the Curt Flood Act. Also, just like in the
case of franchise relocation, there is some disagreement between the
courts whether umpires should be covered under baseball's antitrust im-
munity. In Postema 52 the District Court rejected Baseball's claim of
blanket antitrust immunity. 53 In fact, the court found that baseball anti-
trust exemption only immunized baseball from challenges to its league
structure and its reserve system. 54 The alternative view can be seen in
148. National Football League, 196 F. Supp. 445. The NFL was barred from pooling their
television rights in 1961 when Judge Grim ruled that the NFL's contract with CBS violated an
earlier judgement entered into by the court in United States v. National Football League, 116
F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
In the 1953 case, the United States Justice Department challenged the NFL's black-out
policy as a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Judge Grim, using a rule of reason
analysis, held that while it was reasonable for a team to black-out other NFL games into a
team's home territory on days that the team was playing at home, since the televised game
would be competing with the home team's ticket sales and profits. Any and all restrictions on
broadcasts of other NFL games within the home territory when the team was on the road,
however, would be unreasonable and illegal, since the televised game would not be competing
with the home team's ticket sales and profits.
Therefore, since pooling of television rights would require teams to televise games into the
home territory, contrary to his 1953 judgement, the NFL petitioned Judge Grim in 1961 for a
ruling on the CBS contract. The next step for the NFL was Congress.
149. Wolohan, supra note 146.
150. 15 U.S.C. at § 27 (b)(5).
151. This was especially true in the aftermath of the 1996 playoffs when Baltimore second
baseman Roberto Alomar spit in the face of umpire John Hirschbeck. In the spring of 1997,
the umpires went public with their new strategy to get tough with players and managers. See
Dan Bickley, Umpires Are Drunk On Power, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Aug. 30, 1998, at C12.
There has been some talk that the umpires would soon work out of the MLB Commis-
sioner's office, rather than individual leagues, beginning in 2000 after their current collective
bargaining agreement expires. Before that could happen however, MLB would have to nego-
tiate with Richie Phillips, head of the umpires union. See USA Today, Jan. 15, 1999 at 2C.
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Salerno.155 In Salerno, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, after freely
acknowledging its "belief that Federal Baseball was not one of Mr. Jus-
tice Holmes' happiest days, [and] that the rationale of Toolson is ex-
tremely dubious"' 56 held that overruling the Supreme Court is the
exclusive privilege of the Supreme Court.
57
Once again, Congress had the perfect opportunity to clarify this judi-
cial debate and failed to take advantage of the opportunity. Therefore,
depending on the interpretation of Congress' action or inaction, base-
ball's antitrust exemption may or may not include umpires.
The last area specifically excluded from coverage under the Curt
Flood Act is all persons not in the business of organized professional
major league baseball. 5 Under this section, Vincent Piazza and Vin-
cent Trendi would be excluded from using the Curt Flood Act because
they were not in the business of organized professional major league
baseball at any time. Once again Congress failed to include an impor-
tant group under coverage of the Curt Flood Act-individual, partner-
ships, corporations, trusts, or unincorporated associations who are
attempting to purchase Major League Baseball teams.
After identifying what type of conduct, acts and practices are specifi-
cally excluded from coverage under the Curt Flood Act, Section 27 (c)
states that only major league baseball players have standing to sue Major
League Baseball under the Act.1 9 This limitation of standing seems to
155. In Salerno, two former American League umpires filed antitrust charges against the
league after they were fired by , American League president Joseph E. Cronin for incompe-
tence. The plaintiffs however claimed that the real reason was their attempt to organize the
American League umpires into a union. Salerno v. American League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 429 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir.1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1001 (1971). An unfair labor practice
charge was also filed and the National Labor Relations Board issued a complaint. See 180
N.L.R.B. No. 30 (Dec. 15, 1969).
156. Salerno, 429 F.2d at 1005.
157. See id.
158. 15 U.S.C. §27 (b)(6).
159. §27 (c) states that:
Only a major league baseball player has standing to sue under this section. For the
purposes of this section, a major league baseball player is-
(1) a person who is a party to a major league player's contract, or is playing baseball at
the major league level; or
(2) a person who was a party to a major league player's contract or playing baseball at
the major league level at the time of the injury that is the subject of the complaint; or
(3) a person who has been a party to a major league player's contract or who has
played baseball at the major league level, and who claims he has been injured in his
efforts to secure a subsequent major league player's contract by an alleged violation of
the antitrust laws: Provided however, That for the purposes of this paragraph, the al-
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be directed at depriving the Justice Department, which opposed the Curt
Flood Act, and the Federal Trade Commission the ability to sue Major
League aseball over player restraints. 60
Besides those individuals who are currently under contract, or play-
ing baseball at the major league level, there are three other groups of
individuals who qualify as major league players with standing under the
Flood Act. The first group includes anyone who is under contract or
playing baseball at the major league level at the time of an injury that is
the subject of an antitrust complaint. 6 ' The second group includes any
individual who has played in the majors, and claims he has been injured
in his efforts to secure a subsequent major league player's contract by an
alleged violation of the antitrust laws. 6 z The final group includes anyone
who was under contract or playing in the majors "at the conclusion of
the last full championship season immediately preceding the expiration
of the last collective bargaining agreement."1 63
The final section of note is § 27 (d)(4), which states that:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the application
to organized professional baseball of the nonstatutory labor ex-
emption from antitrust laws. 64
Due to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Brown vs. Pro
Football Inc., 65 the impact the Curt Flood Act will have on collective
leged antitrust violation shall not include any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of
persons in the business of organized professional baseball relating to or affecting em-
ployment to play baseball at the minor league level, including any organized profes-
sional baseball amateur or first-year player draft, or reserve clause as applied to minor
league players; or
(4) a person who was a party to a major league player's contract or who was playing
baseball at the major league level at the conclusion of the last full championship season
immediately preceding the expiration of the last collective bargaining agreement be-
tween persons in the business of organized professional major league baseball and the
exclusive collective bargaining representative of major league baseball players.
160. Curtis, supra note 136.
161. See id. at §27 (c)(2).
162. See id There is an exception to this definition in that the alleged antitrust violation
can not include any conduct, acts, practices relating to or affecting baseball at the minor
league level, including any organized professional baseball amateur or first-year player draft,
or reserve clause as applied to minor league players.
163. Id.
164. Id at §27 (d)(4).
165. 518 U.S. 231 (1996). After the collective-bargaining agreement between the NFL
and the NFL Players Association expired, the two sides began to negotiate a new collective-
bargaining agreement. The NFL presented a plan that would permit each club to establish a
"developmental squad" of substitute players, each of whom would be paid the same $1,000.00
weekly salary. The union rejected this proposal and insisted that individual squad members
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bargaining between MLB and the MLBPA is probably very little. In
Brown, a group of professional football players challenged the right of
the NFL to unilaterally, once an impasse was reached in collective bar-
gaining process, fix the salary of all players assigned to a team's develop-
mental squad. In upholding the NFL's right, as the employer, the
Supreme Court ruled that the league's conduct fell within scope of non-
statutory labor exemption from antitrust liability. The nonstatutory labor
exemption allows parties involved in collective bargaining to engage in
conduct that is authorized by labor law without the fear of being sued
under antitrust law by the other party. 166 As long as there is a union, the
nonstatutory labor exemption will bar the players from filing any anti-
trust claims. Therefore, the only way baseball players could use the Curt
Flood Act would be to decertify their union.167
CONCLUSION
To determine the importance of the Curt Flood Act, we must first
determine what the current status of organized baseball's antitrust ex-
emption is after the passage of the Act. Odd as it may sound, by passing
the Curt Flood Act, Congress may have actually saved baseball's anti-
should be free to negotiate their own salaries. When negotiations reached an impasse, the
NFL unilaterally implemented the plan.
A group of developmental squad players, unhappy over the single salary structure, filed an
antitrust suit against the NFL, claiming that the NFL's agreement to pay them $1,000.00 per
week was a restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, in reversing the District Court decision in favor of the players, held that
the owners were immune from antitrust liability under the federal labor laws. Brown v. Pro
Football 50 F.3d 1041 (D.C. DC 1995).
The Supreme Court, in upholding the Court of Appeals, held that federal labor laws
shields from antitrust attack an agreement to unilaterally implement the terms of their last
best good-faith wage offer when the sides have been bargaining in good faith and an impasse
has been reach. Subjecting such agreements to antitrust law would cause "instability and un-
certainty into the collective-bargaining process," since antitrust laws forbid or discourages or-
ganizations from the types of collective actions that are required under collective bargaining.
Brown, 518 U.S. 231.
The Supreme Court also noted that it had previously found in the labor laws an implicit,
"nonstatutory" antitrust exemption that applies where needed to make the collective-bargain-
ing process work. See, e.g., Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975).
166. Brown, 518 U.S. 231.
167. This was a strategy used by the NFL Players Association and its executive director
Gene Upshaw after it was unable to negotiate a workable collective bargaining agreement
with the league. The NFLPA felt that the only way it could break an impasse in the collective
bargaining process and make any gains was in the area of antitrust law. To sue under antitrust
law, the players first had to decertify the union. See Will McDonough, A Collective Sign of




trust exemption. After the Supreme Court's decision in Flood, there was
a trend among some courts to limit baseball's antitrust exemption to the
reserve system only. Examples of baseball's shrinking antitrust exemp-
tion can be seen in Piazza, Butterworth and Postema. In each of these
cases, the courts interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in Flood as
placing limits on baseball's antitrust exemption, narrowly applying the
exemption only to baseball's player reserve system.
Still, not every court interpreted Flood as placing limits on baseball's
antitrust exemption. The Finley and McCoy courts, for example, upheld
an industry wide antitrust exemption when they held that until Congress
acted to limit baseball's antitrust exemption, the exemption encom-
passed the entire business of baseball.
With the passage of the Curt Flood Act, baseball can now argue that
Congress has acted. As discussed above, the Act is specifically designed
to repeal baseball's antitrust exemption as it applies to Major League
Baseball players. A reasonable interpretation of Congress' decision to
only include Major League Baseball players, therefore would be that
Congress did not want the entire business of baseball to be covered
under a blanket antitrust exemption. Congress could have included mi-
nor league baseball, the amateur draft, the relationship between the ma-
jor leagues and the minors, franchise relocation, intellectual property,
the Sports Broadcasting Act, umpires or any other area it wanted in the
Curt Flood Act, but it specifically excluded them. It only stands to rea-
son, therefore, that Congress in its actions, by failing to include the en-
tire business of baseball in the Curt Flood Act, wanted everything not
having to do with player relations exempt from antitrust laws.
If you accept this interpretation of the Curt Flood Act, the arguments
presented in Piazza, Butterworth and Postema that baseball's antitrust
exemption is just limited to the reserve system, no longer have any value.
Therefore, the Act, instead of weakening baseball's antitrust exemption,
actually makes it stronger.
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